THE first connected account of the Southern campaign of 1780 was that included by Dr. Ramsay in his History of the Revolution of South Carolina, published in 1785;[1] the next that of the Rev. Dr. Gordon, which appeared in 1788[2]. A comparison of these two histories shows that many of the passages descriptive of this particular period are verbally identical. At first, sight it would seem that Gordon adopted the account presented in the earlier volume. But as Gordon in his foot notes repeatedly acknowledges his indebtedness to Dr. Ramsay for information concerning the operations in the Carolinas, yet omits any such acknowledgment in his description of the Southern campaign, there is a fair presumption that the omission was not without reason. That reason seems certainly to be that the account given by Ramsay was furnished to him by Gordon. Dr. Ramsay in 1809, subsequently to the publication of Gordon's history, published a History of South Carolina[3], in which the campaign from Hillsborough to Camden is related in substantially the words of his earlier work. Gordon, in a note to his third volume (p. 59), says that "General Gates' letters were examined by him at [Traveler's Rest] his Seat in Virginia the latter end of 1781." The friendly relations existing between Gates and the worthy historian are well known, and it is not unfair to suppose that he was inclined to give the most favorable coloring possible [on] the conduct of the hero, whose well-won laurels had been blighted in a disaster, the completeness of which was [illegible] of the earlier triumph. Gordon says elsewhere (in a note to his second volume, p. 450) that in compiling his narrative "recourse had been had to a detail of facts written by the deputy adjutant general, Col. Otho H. Williams,[4]" who was himself a prominent actor in the scenes he relates.

"Upon gen. Lincoln's being made a prisoner at Charles Town the command of the forces of the southern district devolved on Baron de Kalb. His experience and abilities were allowed to be great; but as he was a foreigner, unacquainted with the country, and unaccustomed to the temper of undisciplined troops, who were to constitute the major part of the army, these and other reasons wrought in favor of gen. Gates, who was considered in common as the best qualified for the command; and it was unanimously resolved in congress on the 13th day of June that major gen. Gates do immediately repair to and take command of the southern department; the next day he was empowered to take such measures for the defense of the southern states as he might think most proper. He received the resolves of congress at Traveler's Rest in Virginia, a few miles from Shepherd's town, on the 20th, and set out on Monday the 26th. He soon felt for himself, finding that he succeeded to the command of an army without strength, of a military chest without money, of a department apparently deficient in public spirit, and in a climate that increases despondency, instead of animating the soldier's arm. He had before him the most unpromising prospects his eyes ever beheld. He arrived at the camp on the 25th of July; and at a review of the troops the next day, was in every respect received by the Baron with marks of great distinction. In return he treated his predecessor with due consideration, confirmed his standing orders, and requested that he would keep the command of his division as formerly in the grand army. The Baron's division consisted of all the Maryland and Delaware troops: these with a small legionary corps under col. Armand, consisting of about 60 horse and as many foot soldiers, who arrived a few days before, and three companies of artillery, constituted the whole of the army. The Baron with great satisfaction complied with Gates's request. A considerable body of North Carolina militia had taken the field under gen. Caswell. His appointment and instructions to join and co-operate with the regular forces had been announced to the Baron, who daily expected his arrival, and with him a considerable supply of provisions. Caswell, however, upon the plea of preventing some disaffected inhabitants from taking arms in favor of the enemy, excused his not complying with the instructions; and as to the supply, though promised, no part of it ever arrived. On the morning of July the 27th, gen. Gates marched at the head of the army to effect a junction of the regular and irregular forces, to assume an appearance of hostile views upon the enemy's advanced posts, under expectation of sharing with the militia the supply they received from the state. The troops passed Deep river at the Buffalo-ford, and encamped in the afternoon at Spinks' farm on the road to Camden. (Vol. III., 391)

"On the 28th of July (the day after the American army encamped at Spinks' farm on the road to Camden) col. Otho H. Williams repeated to gen. Gates the advice he had given in substance to baron de Kalb more than a fortnight before; which was to deviate from the direct road to Camden-to order gen. Caswell to join him at the mouth of Rocky river on Peedee and from thence to send his heavy baggage, women and invalids to Salisbury (a day's march higher up the country) and there establish an hospital and magazines-to march all his effective troops from the mouth of Rocky river to Charlotte, where a magazine, hospital,

"The army soon felt the scarcity of provisions; and their fatigue, fasting and repeated disappointments as to supplies so exasperated them, that their murmurs became very audible. The aspect of mutiny was in almost every countenance; but as there was no object to be seized upon or sacrificed, the conciliating arguments of the officers, who shared the calamity without discrimination, induced the soldiers to forbear and rely upon legal expedients and a good providence for succour. The principal means of subsistence found on the march were lean cattle accidentally picked up in the woods. Meal and flour were so very scarce, that their whole army was obliged to make use of green corn and peaches, as the best substitutes for bread the country afforded. Dysenteries afflicted the troops in consequence of such diet. It was however the least of two evils. They had no other relief from famine, which added to the intense heat of the season, and unhealthiness of the climate, threatened destruction to the army. Starvation became a cant term upon the occasion. Perhaps the burlesque introduced by the ignorance of some of the policy of others to show a contempt for their sufferings, contributed not a little to the resolute stoutness that now discovered itself.

"In the afternoon of the 5th of August, the American general was informed from gen. Caswell, that he meant to surprise or attack a part of the enemy, on little Lynch's creek. This made Gates the more anxious for a junction, as he apprehended some injudicious adventure might deprive him of the assistance which the militia were capable of affording. The next morning intelligence arrived from the same authority, which increased his anxiety to a painful degree, it was, that the enemy just mentioned, meditated an attack upon the militia in their encampment. Such a show of enterprise, and such marks of intimidation-such a contrariety of intentions and apprehensions perplexed the commanding officer, and made the junction still more desirable. Gates therefore gave orders for the troops to clean their arms and to have every thing ready for action; and then proceeded with his deputy adjutant general and aids to the encampment of the militia, whom he found to be a fine body of men, deficient only in discipline and military arrangements. Whether Caswell found his vanity gratified in a separate command, or wished to precipitate the army into an action with the enemy, was not discoverable: the fact is, he postponed a junction until he saw

"At Deep creek (August 6th) the troops received a supply of good beef, and half a pound of Indian corn meal per man. They eat their mess; drank of the stream contentedly; and the next day with great cheerfulness marched to the cross-roads, where they were joined by the militia, and the whole were encamped together. A good understanding appeared to subsist among the officers of all ranks, and the common soldiers vied with each other in supporting their spirits and despising their fatigues, which they appeared to forget. The expectation of this junction had induced the commanding officer of the post on Lynch's creek to retire the day before, under the mask of offensive operations, which caused the alarm above related.

"Being now in a country of pine barrens, extensive sand-hills and impenetrable swamps, unable to collect provisions and forage from the lower and more fertile parts of the country, which were covered by the enemy's advanced posts, the army could not remain more than a day in this situation, though a large reinforcement of militia from Virginia was expected every hour. Gates therefore pressed forward; and finding the enemy disposed to dispute the passage of Lynchs' creek, while he kept up an appearance of taking that route, he marched the army by the right towards Clermont (better known by the name of Rugeley's mills) where the enemy had a small garrison. His intentions being discovered, both posts were abandoned with some precipitation on the 11th, the officers fearing either that their march to Camden would be intercepted, or that they should be attacked on their retreat. Lord Rawdon, who commanded the advanced posts of the British army, assembled all his forces at Camden, and suffered gen. Gates, without any material interruption, to conduct his army to Clermont about 13 miles from Camden, where his troops encamped on the 13th. The next day brigadier gen. Stevens arrived with a respectable reinforcement of 700 Virginia militia. An express also arrived the same day from col. Sumpter, who reported to Gates, that a number of the South Carolina militia had joined him on the west side of the Wateree; and that an escort of clothing, ammunition and other stores for the garrison at Camden, was on the way from Charles Town, and must pass the Wateree at a ferry about a mile from Camden, under cover of a small redoubt occupied by the enemy, on the opposite bank of the river.

"A detachment of the Maryland line, consisting of 100 regular infantry and a company of artillery, with two brass field pieces, and 300 North Carolina militia, were immediately forwarded under the command of lieut. Col. Woolford to join col. Sumpter, who had orders to reduce the redoubt and intercept the convoy. Gen. Gates was preparing at the same time to advance still nearer to Camden, and if necessary, to take a position on some good grounds in its vicinity; but he was not without hope that Lord Rawdon would evacuate that post as he had the others; and if he should not, the prospect was, that the multitudes of militia expected from the upper counties would cut off his supplies from all quarters, and leave the garrison an easy prey to the army. After making some convenient arrangements, having the arms cleaned, and distributing some provisions, which had been collected, Gates convened his general officers, of which grade there were not less than thirteen in that little army, the militia brigades of North Carolina having far more than sufficient; and after a conference with them, he directed the deputy adjutant general, col. Williams, to issue the following orders, with the intention as well to take advantage of the time when col. Sumpter was to execute his enterprise, as to be prepared for action himself, in case it should be offered.

"When the deputy adjutant general received these orders, he showed Gates an abstract of the field returns of the different corps, which he had just been digesting into a general return. From thence it appeared that the whole American Army, officers included, amounted only to 3,663 (exclusive of the troops detached to col. Sumpter), beside col. Porterfield's and major Armstrong's light infantry, amounting to 250, and col. Armand's legion to 120, altogether 370, and a few volunteer cavalry. There were about 900 continental infantry, rank and file, and 70 cavalry. This force was inferior to what the general imagined; his plan, however, was adopted, and he thought it too late to retreat. The army marched about ten at night, and had proceeded to within half a mile of Sander's creek, about half way to Camden, when a firing commenced in front.

"Lord Cornwallis, unknown to gen. Gates, arrived the day before at Camden. His inferior force, consisting of about 1700 infantry and 300 cavalry, would have justified a retreat; but considering that no probable events of an action could be more injurious to the royal interest than that measure, he resolved upon taking the first good opportunity of attacking the Americans; and learning that the situation of their encampment at Clermont was disadvantageous, he marched about the same time the Americans did, with a full determination to attack them in their camp at daybreak. About half an hour past two in the morning the advanced parties of both armies met in the woods, and a firing commenced. Some of the cavalry of Armand's legion being wounded by the first fire, threw the others into disorder, and the whole recoiled so suddenly, that the first Maryland regiment, in front of the column, was broken, and the whole line of the army thrown into a general consternation. This first impression struck deep. The light infantry, however, executed their orders, and particularly those under Porterfield behaved with such spirit, that the enemy was no less surprised at this unexpected meeting. A few prisoners were taken on both sides, by whose information the respective commanders derived a knowledge of the circumstances, of which both, till then, were ignorant. Porterfield, in whose abilities and activity Gates had justly placed great dependence, received a musket ball, which shattered the bones of his leg, and was under the necessity of submitting to be carried to the rear. A part of the light infantry still kept their ground, and being supported by the vanguard of the legion infantry, which discovered much bravery, the American army soon recovered its order. Cornwallis also kept his ground; and frequent skirmishes ensued during the night, with scarce any other effect than to discover the situation of the armies, to evince the intentions of the generals, and to serve as a prelude to what was to occur in the morning.

"Immediately after the alarm, the American army was formed in the following manner — the Second Maryland brigade, under gen. Gist, on the right of the line, flanked by a morass; the North Carolina division, under gen. Caswell, in the centre; — and the Virginia brigade, under gen. Stevens, on the left, flanked by the North Carolina militia, light infantry and a morass; thus both flanks were well covered. The artillery was posted on the most advantageous ground near the main road, which was about the centre of the line. Col. Armand's corps was ordered to the left, to support the left flank, and oppose the enemy's cavalry. Baron de Kalb commanded on the right of the line; and gen. Smallwood the

"The British army was thus disposed-the division on the right consisted of a small corps of light infantry, the 23d and 33d regiments, under lieut. Col. Webster; — the division on the left was formed of the volunteers of Ireland, the infantry of the legion, and part of lieut. Col. Hamilton's North Carolina regiment, under Lord Rawdon, with 2 six and 2 three pounders, commanded by lieut. McLeod; — the 71st regiment with a six pounder, composed the reserve, one battalion in the rear of the right division, the other of the left; — and the cavalry of the legion stationed in the rear, close to the 71st regiment. This disposition was made at break of day; but before it took place the British appeared in column about 200 yards in front of the American artillery, while gen. Gates was with his corps-de-reserve. Col. Williams ordered the artillery to be fired upon them, which was instantly obeyed; and then went to inform Gates of the occasion of the firing, and the enemy's having the appearance of spreading and forming a line by their right, 'which,' said the colonel, 'gives us a favorable opportunity of commencing the attack of infantry with Stevens' brigade.' The General answered, 'Very proper, let it be done.' Orders were immediately given to Stevens, who advanced with his brigade in excellent order with great alacrity. The enemy had however, formed their line before he got near enough for action. Both lines were advancing, and had come within firing distance of each other, when Stevens, encouraging his men, put them in mind of their bayonets, which they had received only the day before, calling out to them, 'My brave fellows, you have bayonets as well as they, we'll charge them.' Col. Williams had advanced in front of the brigade, from which he had taken a few volunteers, intending, by a partial fire, to extort that of the enemy at some distance, in expectation that the militia would stand the first discharge, and be brought to closer action with their loaded muskets. But the advantage was lost. Lord Cornwallis observing the movement of the Virginians under Stevens, gave orders to lieut. Col. Webster to begin an attack. The British infantry upon that rushed through the thin fire of the militia with great intrepidity, and furiously charged the brigade with a cheer. The intimidated militia threw down most of their arms, bayonets and all, and with the utmost precipitation and trepidation fled from the field, and were followed by the North Carolina militia light infantry. The whole North Carolina division being panic struck, imitated the shameful example; except one regiment, commanded by col. Dixon, next in the line of battle to the continental regulars, which fired several rounds; indeed gen. Gregory's brigade, to which that regiment belonged, paused longer than the others; but at last all fled, and the majority without their arms, or firing a single shot. It cannot appear excessively strange that such raw militia could not stand before bayonets, when it

"All the militia who composed the left wing and centre being routed, the second continental brigade, consisting of Maryland and Delaware troops, making the right wing, and the corps-de-reserve, were left to fight or retreat; but as they had no orders for the latter, they maintained their position with great resolution, and gave the British an unexpected check. The second brigade even gained ground and took no less than 50 prisoners. But the corps-de-reserve being considerably outflanked, were thrown into disorder; they were soon rallied by their officers, and renewed the action with much spirit. Overpowered by numbers they were again broken; but the brave example and exertions of the officers induced them to form afresh. The gallantry of this corps covered, in a great measure, the left of the second brigade, which was in a manner blended with the enemy's line on their left, where the conflict was desperate. The Americans, thinking themselves master of the field, disputed with the British who should conquer and retain the other as prisoners of war. At length the enemy directing their whole force against these two devoted corps, the fire of musketry became yet more tremendous, and was continued with equal perseverance and obstinacy, till Lord Cornwallis observing that there were no cavalry opposed to him, pushed forward his dragoons, and charging with his bayonets at the same moment, put an end to the contest. Never did men behave better than the continentals in the whole of the action; but all attempts to rally the militia were ineffectual. Lieut. Col. Tarleton's legion charged them as they broke, and pursued them as they were fleeing. Without having it in their power to defend themselves they fell in great numbers under the legionary sabres.

"General Gates was borne off the field by a torrent of dismayed militia. They constituted so great a part of his army, that when he saw them break and flee with such precipitation, he lost every hope of victory; and his only care was, if possible, to rally a sufficient number to cover the retreat of the regular troops; he retired with gen. Caswell to Clermont, in hope of halting them at their late encampment. But the further they fled, the more they dispersed, and the generals giving up all as lost retired with a very few attendants to Charlotte. On their retreat, an officer from col. Sumpter overtook them, and reported to Gates, that the colonel had succeeded fully in his enterprise the evening before against the enemy's post on the Wateree; had reduced the redoubt and captured the guard; and had intercepted the escort with the stores, which were all taken, with about 40 waggons and upwards of 100 prisoners. Gates however could take no advantage of this success; the enemy was at his heels, and his victorious friends on the opposite side of a river too distant to form a junction in time to prevent his fate.

"Most of the Virginia militia returned to Hillsborough by the route they came to camp; and gen. Stevens found means to stop a considerable number at that place; but the term for which they had taken the field being nearly expired, all who had not deserted were soon afterward discharged. The North Carolinians fled different ways, as their hopes led or their fears drove them; and many were intercepted by their disaffected countrymen, who but a few days before had gen- erally submitted to Gates, by whom they were generously sent to their homes, upon a promise of remaining neuter or of following his colours. Several considerable

"Baron de Kalb, while exerting himself with great bravery to prevent the defeat of the day, received eleven wounds. His aid-de-camp, lieut. Col. Du Buysson, embraced him, announced his rank and nation to the surrounding foe, and begged that they would spare his life. While he generously exposed himself to save his friend, he received sundry dangerous wounds, and was taken prisoner. The baron expired in a short time, though he received the most particular assistance from the British. He spent his last breath in dictating a letter, expressive of the warmest affection for the officers and men of his division-of the greatest satisfaction in the testimony given by the British army of the bravery of his troops-of his being charmed with the firm opposition they made to superior force, when abandoned by the rest of the army-of the infinite pleasure he received from the gallant behaviour of the Delaware regiment, and the companies of artillery attached to the brigades-and of the endearing sense he entertained of the merit of the whole division he commanded. The Congress resolved on the 14th of October, that a monument should be erected to his memory in Annapolis, the metropolis of Maryland, with a very honorable inscription. Gen. Rutherford surrendered to a part of the British legion. All the other general officers escaped; but were separated from their respective commands, and obliged to flee with precipitation. Every corps was broken, and dispersed through the woods. The bogs and brush, which in a degree screened them form the fury of their foes, laid them under the necessity of separating from each other. Major Anderson, of the 3d Maryland regiment, was the only infantry officer, whose efforts to rally the men, after the total routs, were in any degree effectual. A few individuals of several companies joined him at some distance from the field and others added to that small number by falling into his ranks on the march. The removal of the heavy baggage to Waxhaws was delayed till the morning of the action contrary to Gate's express orders the day preceding; so that the greatest part, together with all that followed the army, fell into the hands of the enemy, or was plundered in the route by those who went off early, and could take time for such baseness. A general transfer of property took place; even that which escaped the foe fell not again into the hands of the right owners, except some small part of the officers' baggage, which was recovered at Charlotte. The baggage wagons indeed of gen. Gates and baron de Kalb, being furnished with stout horses and clever drivers, who understood their business and knew the roads, were fully preserved. All the baron's baggage and papers were saved; as were Gates's, and every paper and private letter of all the gentlemen belonging to his family. The pursuit was rapid for more than twenty miles; and so great was the dismay of the retreating troops (the cries of the murdered in the rear, being echoed by the women and wounded men with increasing terror) that at the distance of forty miles whole teams of horses were cut out of the wagons to accelerate the flight. Many wounded officers and soldiers were got off by like expedients; some of whom gave astonishing proofs of what pain, fatigue, and want, the human constitution can bear. The road by which the troops fled was covered with arms, baggage, the sick, the wounded, and the dead. Gates was persuaded by all that he saw and heard, that the regular troops were entirely cut off, and the whole either killed or captured; and that there was no prospect of collecting a force at Charlotte (where he arrive late in the night) adequate to the defence of the country; he therefore left Gen. Caswell at Charlotte to assemble the militia of Mecklenburg country, and proceeded with all possible dispatch to Hillsborough , to

"Lord Cornwallis's victory was complete. The Americans lost eight field pieces, the whole of their artillery, with all their ammunition wagons, besides 150 others, a considerable quantity of military stores, and the greatest part of their baggage. The numbers slain cannot be precisely ascertained, no returns of the militia ever being made after the action. Three hundred of the North Carolina militia, besides 63 wounded, were made prisoners. Only three of the Virginia militia were left wounded on the field of battle: owing to their making no stand, and being first in flight, but few of them were captivated. From the abstract of muster and inspection, taken at Hillsborough October the 1st, it appears that exclusive of baron de Kalb and gen. Rutherford, the numbers of killed, captured and missing, in the action of the 16th and 18th, were 4 lieutenant colonels, 3 majors, 14 captains, 4 captain lieutenants, 16 lieutenants, 3 ensigns, 4 staff, 78 subalterns, and 604 rank and file. The impossibility of accounting with certainty for those who fell in battle, and those who fell into the hands of the enemy obliged the officers to make many missing, who were probably killed or prisoners. Through Cornwallis's victory was complete, yet from the accounts which the British gave of the action, it may be inferred it was dearly bought. Gates apprehended early in September, that he had established it as a certain fact, that more than 500 of their old troops were killed or wounded.

"On the 17th and 18th of August, brigadiers Smallwood and Gist, with several other officers, arrived at Charlotte (full 80 miles from the place of action) where upwards of a hundred regular infantry, col. Armand's cavalry, and a major Davie's small partisan corps of horse from the Waxhaw settlement had collected. Smallwood had been separated from the first Maryland brigade, after the men had been engaged a while, by the interposal of the enemy; and finding it impracticable to rejoin them, as well as apprehending they must be overpowered and could not retreat, rode off for personal safety. The little provisions which the troops met with at Charlotte, proved a most seasonable refreshment. The drooping spirits of the officers began to revive; and hopes were entertained, that a respectable force might soon be again assembled from the country militia, and from the addition of col. Sumpter's victorious detachment. All these prospects however were soon obscured by the intelligence on the 19th of the complete dispersion of that corps." (Vol. III, 429)

As Gordon's was the earliest, so Bancroft's[6] is the latest authoritative account of this disastrous campaign. In the tenth volume of his great work he narrates in his rapid, vivid style, the incidents of the advance and the retreat, and finally dismisses the fallen hero of Saratoga with the contemptuous character of "a petty intriguer, but no soldier." That the reader may justly weigh the accuracy of the old and the new judgments, Mr. Bancroft's account is given in full. And here it is proper to say that the venerable author, in his recent "thoroughly revised edition,"[7] has adhered without the alteration even of a word, to the text of his original statement.

"Washington wished Greene to succeed Lincoln; congress, not asking his advice, and not ignorant of his opinion, on the thirteenth of June unanimously appointed Gates to the command of the southern army, and constituted him independent of the commander-in-chief. He received his orders from congress, and was to make his reports directly to that body, which bestowed on him unusual powers and all its confidence. He might address himself directly to Virginia and the states beyond it for supplies; of himself alone appoint all staff officers; and take such measures as he should think most proper for the defence of the south.

"From his plantation in Virginia, Gates made his acknowledgment to congress without elation; to Lincoln he wrote in modest and affectionate language. His first important act was the request to congress for the appointment of Morgan as a brigadier-general in the continental service, and in this he was supported by Jefferson and Rutledge. He enjoined on the corps of White and Washington, and on all remnants of continental troops in Virginia, to repair to the southern army with all possible diligence. "Upon information received at Hillsborough from Huger, of South Carolina, Gates formed his plan to march directly to Camden, confident of its easy capture, and the consequent recovery of the country. To Kalb he wrote; 'Enough has already been lost in vain defence of Charleston; if more is sacrificed, the southern states are undone; and this may go nearly to undo the rest.'

"Arriving in the camp of Kalb, he was confirmed in his purpose by Thomas Pinckney, who was his aid, and by Marion. It was the opinion of Kalb that the enemy would not make a stand at Camden. His first words ordered the troops to be prepared to march at a moment's warning. The safest route, recommended by a memorial of the principal officers, was by way of Salisbury and Charlotte, through a most fertile, salubrious and well cultivated country, inhabited by Presbyterians, who were heartily attached to the cause of independence, and among whom a post of defence might have been established in case of disaster. But Gates was impatient; and having detached Marion towards the interior of South Carolina, to watch the motions of the enemy and furnish intelligence, he, on the morning of the twenty-seventh of July, put what he called the 'grand army' on its march by the shortest route to Camden, through a barren country, which could offer no food but lean cattle, fruit, and unripe maize.

"On the third of August the army crossed the Peedee River, making a junction on its southern bank with Lieutenant-colonel Porterfield of Virginia, an excellent officer, who had been sent to the relief of Charleston, and had kept his small

"The force of which Gates could dispose was greater than that which could be brought against him, it revived the hopes of the South Carolinians, who were writhing under the insolence of any army in which every soldier was a licensed plunderer, and every officer a functionary with power to outlaw peaceful citizens at will. The British commander on the Peedee called in his detachments, abandoned his post on the Cheraw Hill, and repaired to Lord Rawdon at Camden. An escort of Carolinians, who had been forced to take up arms on the British side, rose against their officers, and made prisoners of a hundred and six British invalids who were descending the Peedee River. A large boat from Georgetown, laden with stores for the British at Cheraw, was seized by Americans. A general revolt in the public mind against British authority invited Gates onwards. To the encouragements of others, the General added his own illusions; he was confident that Cornwallis, with detached troops from his main body, was gone to Savannah, and from his camp on the Peedee he announced on the fourth, by a proclamation, that their late triumphant and insulting foes had retreated with precipitation and dismay on the approach of his numerous, well appointed and formidable army; forgiveness was promised to those who had been forced to profess allegiance, and pardon was withheld only from those apostate sons of America who should hereafter support the enemy.

"On the seventh, at the Cross Roads, the troops with Gates made a junction with the North Carolina militia under Caswell, and proceeded towards the enemy at Lynch's Creek.

"In the following night, that post was abandoned; and Lord Rawdon occupied another on the southern bank of Little Lynch's Creek, unassailable for the deep, muddy channel of the river, and within a day's march of Camden. Here he was joined by Tarleton with a small detachment of cavalry, who on their way had mercilessly ravished the country on the Black River as a punishment to its patriot inhabitants, and as a terror to the dwellers on the Wateree and Santee. By forced march up the stream, Gates could have turned Lord Rawdon's flank, and made an easy conquest of Camden. Missing his only opportunity on the eleventh, after a useless halt of two days, he defiled by the right, and marching to the north of Camden, on the thirteenth encamped at Clermont, which the British had just abandoned. The time thus allowed, Rawdon used to strengthen himself by four companies from Ninety Six, as well as by the troops from Clermont, and to throw up redoubts at Camden. "On the evening of the tenth, Cornwallis left Charleston, and arrived at Camden before the dawn of the fourteenth. At ten o'clock on the night of the fifteenth, he set his troops in motion, in the hopes of joining battle with the Americans at the break of day.

"On the fourteenth, Gates had been joined by seven hundred Virginia militia under the command of Stevens. On the same day, Sumter, appearing in camp with four hundred men, asked as many more to intercept a convoy with its stores on the road from Charleston to Camden. Gates, who believed himself at the head of seven thousand men, granted his request. Sumter left the camp, taking with him eight hundred men, and on the next morning captured the wagons and their escort.

"An exact field return proved to Gates that he had but three thousand and fifty-two rank and file present and fit for duty. 'These are enough,' said he, 'for our purpose;' and on the fifteenth he communicated to a council of officers

"At half-past two on the morning of the sixteenth, about nine miles from Camden, the advance guard of Cornwallis fell in with the advance guard of the Americans. To the latter, the collision was a surprise. Their cavalry as in front, but Armand, its commander, who disliked his orders, was insubordinate; the horsemen in his command turned suddenly and fled, and neither he nor they did any service that night or the next day. The retreat of Armand's legion produced confusion in the first Maryland brigade, and spread consternation throughout the army, till the light infantry on the right, under the command of Colonel Porterfield, threw back the party that made the attack and restored order; but at a great price, for Porterfield received a wound which proved mortal.

"To a council of the American general officers, held immediately in the rear of the lines, Gates communicated the report of a prisoner, that a large regular force of British troops under Cornwallis was five or six hundred yards in their front, and submitted the question whether it would be proper to retreat. Stevens declared himself eager for battle, saying that 'the information was but a stratagem of Rawdon to escape the attack.' No other advice being offered, Gates desired them to form in line of battle.

"The position of Lord Cornwallis was most favorable. A swamp on each side secured his flanks against the superior numbers of the Americans. At daybreak his last dispositions were made. The front line, to which were attached two six-pounders and two three-pounders, was commanded on the right by Lieutenant-colonel Webster, on the left by Lord Rawdon; a battalion, with a six-pounder, was posted behind each wing as a reserve; the cavalry were in the rear, ready to charge or to pursue.

"On the American side, the second Maryland brigade, of which Gist was brigadier, and the men of Delaware occupied the right under Kalb; the North Carolina division with Caswell, the centre; and Stevens with the newly arrived Virginia militia, the left; the best troops on the side strongest by nature, the worse on the weakest. The first Maryland brigade, at the head of which Smallwood should have appeared, formed a second line, about two hundred years in the rear of the first. The artillery was divided between the two brigades.

"Gates took his place in the rear of the second line. He gave no order till Otho Williams proposed to him to begin the attack with the brigade of Stevens, his worst troops, who had been with the army only one day. Stevens gave the word, and as they prepared to move forward Cornwallis ordered Webster, whose division contained his best troops, to assail them, while Rawdon was to engage the American right. As the British with Webster rushed on, firing and shouting huzza, Stevens reminded his militia that they had bayonets; but they had received them only the day before, and knew not how to use them; so, dropping their muskets, they escaped to the woods with such speed that not more than three of them were killed or wounded.

"Caswell and the militia of North Carolina, except the few who had Gregory for their brigadier, followed the example; so that nearly two-thirds of the army fled without firing a shot. Gates writes of them, as an eye-witness: 'The British cavalry continuing to harass their rear, they ran like a torrent and bore all

"The militia having been routed, Webster came round the flank of the first Maryland brigade, and attacked them in front and on their side. Though Smallwood was nowhere to be found, they were sustained by the reserve, till the brigade was outflanked by greatly superior numbers, and obliged to give ground. After being twice rallied, they finally retreated. The division which Kalb commanded continued long in action, and never did troops show greater courage than these men of Maryland and Delaware. The horse of Kalb had been killed under him, and he had been badly wounded; yet he continued the fight in front. At last, in the hope that victory was on his side, he led a charge, drove the division under Rawdon, took fifty prisoners, and would not believe that he was not about to gain at the day when Cornwallis poured against him a party of dragoons and infantry. Even then he did not yield, until disabled by many wounds.

"The victory costs the British about five hundred of their best troops; 'their great loss,' wrote Marion, 'is equal to a defeat.' How many Americans perished on the field, or surrendered, is not accurately known. They saved none of their artillery and little of their baggage. Except one hundred continental soldiers, whom Gist conducted across the swamps, through which the cavalry could not follow, every corps was dispersed. The canes and underwood that hid them from their pursuers separated them from one another.

"Kalb lingered for three days; but before he closed his eyes he bore an affectionate testimony to the exemplary conduct of the division which he had commanded, and of which two-fifths had fallen in battle. Opulent, and happy in his wife and children, he gave to the United States his life and his example. Congress voted him a monument. The British Parliament voted thanks to Cornwallis.

"Gates and Caswell, who took flight with the militia, gave up all for lost; and leaving the army without orders, rode in all haste to Clermont, which they reached ahead of all the fugitives, and then pressed on, and still on, until late in the night, the two Generals escorted each other into Charlotte. The next morning, Gates, who was a petty intriguer, not a soldier, left Caswell to rally such troops as might come in; and himself sped to Hillsborough, where the North Carolina legislature was soon to meet, riding altogether more than two hundred miles in three days and a half, and running away from his army so fast and so far that he knew nothing about its condition. Caswell, after spending one day at Charlotte, disobeyed the order of his chief and followed his example.

"On the nineteenth, American officers, coming into Charlotte, placed their hopes of a happier turn of events on Sumter, who commanded the largest American force that now remained in the Carolinas."

These narratives of Gordon and Bancroft present antagonistic views of the character and military capacity of Gates. The one represents the opinion held of him by his contemporaries, the other the subsequent verdict of our most distinguished historian. The purpose of the present paper is to note their differences, and to re-open the argument in the new light which the recently discovered papers of General Gates throw upon the subject.

When the news of the surrender of Charleston to the British, on the 12th of May, reached Philadelphia, where Congress was sitting, the necessity of a reorganization of the Southern Department was immediately apparent, and the eyes of the country turned instinctively to General Gates. Washington, Mr. Bancroft asserts, "wished Greene to succeed Lincoln," but "Congress not asking his advice, and not ignorant of his opinion, on the 13th June, unanimously appointed Gates to the command of the Southern army, and made him independent of the Commander-in-Chief." According to Gordon, the "reasons that wrought in favor of General Gates were that he was considered in common as the best qualified for the command." That this was the general opinion of men well competent to judge, including those who had served under him in the Saratoga campaign, is amply sustained by documentary evidence. Colonel Morgan, who commanded the riflemen who turned the tide at Bemus' Heights in the battle of the 19th September, had watched the conduct of affairs with considerable alarm. Doubting the capacity of Lincoln, he had, unsolicited, written to a member of the Board of War to urge the assignment of Gates, in who he had the utmost confidence, to the southern command. Informed of his appointment, he wrote to him on the 24th June, that he was "exceedingly glad that he had the command to the southward," among other reasons, because "his character would stir up the people and put fresh life into them," and then hastened to give his advice to Jefferson, the Governor of Virginia, concerning the employment of the militia of that State.

John Rutledge, the Governor of South Carolina, who had witnessed the British successes in his neighborhood, had already written dispatches to the South Carolina delegates in Congress to urge the assignment of Gates to the southern department, and driven from his home by their further advance, hurried to Philadelphia to secure the "appointment of an able and experienced General for that purpose." Finding that his wishes coincided with the sentiment of Congress, he immediately wrote to Gates expressing his satisfaction, and tendering him every assistance in his power. Governor Nash of North Carolina, expressed the same satisfaction in these significant words: "We think ourselves highly favored by Congress, Sir, in having a gentleman of your approved abilities and good conduct appointed to the command in chief in these Southern States," and pledged his hearty support. Richard Peters, Secretary of the Board of War, in an affectionate note, assured him of his contentment, and recalled the disastrous

[256] TOP situation of the northern states from which Gates rescued them by his military skill at Saratoga. "Our affairs to the southward look blue-so they did when you took command before the Burgoynade I can only now say, go and do likewise-God bless you."

Nor was the Chevalier de la Luzerne, the representative of the generous monarch whose fleet was hourly expected with timely succor, less marked in his words of pleasure with the appointment. "The choice (he wrote on the 6th July) which the thirteen Sates have made of you in the present condition of affairs, to labor to reestablish matters in the Southern States, gives me every ground for favorable augury of the success of the enterprises you may undertake. The union of your interests with our own is so intimate that we congratulate ourselves as much as the United States at seeing such important operations in your hands." These seem to be sufficient evidence of the correctness of Gordon's statement that "Gates was considered in common as the best qualified for the command." It also appears that it was in difference to this common opinion that Congress made the appointment, and not in consequence of any importunity on the party of General Gates or his immediate personal friends, as has been hinted, if not directly charged, while the interference of Rutledge shows with equal conclusiveness that Gates was not alone the choice of the New England members of Congress in a supposed jealousy of Washington's paramount influence, but that he was the choice, also, of those most immediately concerned in the conduct of affairs in the southern department.

Peters' opinion of the "blue" aspect of affairs has been quoted. Nor were the Armstrongs, father and son, better satisfied with the outlook. "Whilst I congratulate you," wrote John Armstrong on the 15th June, "on your present unanimous appointment to the command of the Southern department, I cannot be insensible of the prospect before you & the many known & unknown difficulties you have to encounter. Let wisdom, patience and fortitude from above carry you through." And the son, John Armstrong, Jr., a few days later, in his characteristic eccentric vein, says, "As it stands I don't know whether the appointment be a matter of condolement or congratulation," and adds, "be it eventually, my dear General, what it will, I intend to share your fortunes and shall be with you in a few days." To the modesty of the deportment of Gates, Mr. Bancroft himself bears witness. "He made his acknowledgment to Congress without elation." Gates' own words express more that this sentence implies. "While I live I shall be happy to execute the commands of Congress, and

[257] TOP notwithstanding they have given me a new field for action, and that in the most untoward circumstances, I promise them I will do my utmost to save and most effectually to serve the general interest in the Southern States."

The resolution of Congress, conferring the appointment, was accompanied by a letter from the war office (June 15, 1780) which enclosed a letter from Baron de Kalb, on whom the command of the southern department had devolved after the surrender of Lincoln, showing his situation and pointed out to Gates the necessity of his "immediate presence to organize and collect the too much divided little force which he would have for the beginning of his army," and furnished him an estimate of the forces, amounting to 3,200 total in rank and file.

The difficulties which General Gates encountered, concisely stated by Gordon, are passed by in silence by Bancroft. The letters now first published fully bear out the words of Gordon: "He soon felt for himself, finding that he succeeded to the command of an army without strength, of a military chest without money, of a department apparently deficient in public spirit, and in a climate that increased despondency instated of animating the soldier's arm. He had before him the most unpromising prospect his eyes ever beheld." These words of Gordon are without change from the letter Gates himself wrote from Fredericksburg, July 4, to General Lincoln, his predecessor, condoling with him on his defeat, and soliciting his advice in the management of the people he was about to command.

Those which he wrote from Hillsborough, on his arrival on the 19th July, to the President of Congress and Governors Jefferson and Nash, give a strong picture of the 'deplorable state in which he found every arm of the service. An entire deficiency of magazines; a hospital without medicines or stores of any kind; arms partly out of repair; too many without cartridge boxes, and all destitute of bayonet belts; without tents; frequent intervals of twenty-four hours in which the army, without distinction, were obliged to feed upon such green vegetables as they could find, having neither animal food or corn; the treasury of Virginia without a single dollar, and that of North Carolina, on which he had also warrants from Congress, in a like deficiency.' Yet the brave hearted old man still clung to the hope that with the united and animated endeavors of Virginia and North Carolina, all might be saved. With tireless energy he finally supplied all immediate deficiencies. In the evening of the 24th July he arrived at the Camp of de Kalb, at Cox's Mills, and in the morning following summoned a meeting of general officers for Thursday, the 27th, to consult on a plan of campaign,

[258] TOP inviting the presence of Major General Caswell, who commanded the North Carolina Militia, and of Generals Rutherford and Harrington. To Caswell he expressed his satisfaction in the belief that the active "measures taken by the governments of Virginia and North Carolina" would enable him "to push the enemy from their advanced posts." Bancroft says that from information received while at Hillsborough from General Huger, "Gates formed his plan to march directly to Camden, confident of its easy capture and the consequent recovery of the country." The authority for this statement is not given, and the letter of Gates to Governor Nash, which went with General Huger to the Governor, announces no such intention, but contains only the general expression "that with proper exertions he had no doubt that the enemy might be confined to Charles Town, and finally expelled from it."

It was not until he reached de Kalb's camp that he arrived at any plan. He was warmly received by de Kalb, who was made "happy by his arrival," being in strait for provisions and in trouble with his cavalry officers. Here he found information, from Colonel Sumpter, concerning the British force, which was by that enterprising officer estimated at 3,240 men, scattered over twelve posts, including Charleston and Savannah. At Camden and its vicinity Sumpter considered there were not over 700 men, and in the Cheraws 600 were reported.

In his letter, which was of the 17th July, from his camp on the Catawba River, and addressed to de Kalb, Sumpter strongly urged immediate efforts to prevent a junction of these different bodies, "which if attempted could not possibly be effected in less than twelve to fifteen days time." He pointed out "how vastly weak the enemy was by being so detached in small parties." "If," he added, "they are permitted to retreat slowly to Charles Town, or have an opportunity of collecting the forces and embodying the militia, whom they compel to do duty;" "If, I say," (he repeats his opinion,) "they are suffered to do this, they will by that means add above ten thousand men to their army, and thereby become so strong as not only to keep possession of Charles Town, but also a great part of the State besides." The plan suggested by Sumpter to prevent this junction need not be considered here, these extracts from his letters being merely introduced to show the nature of the arguments for a rapid advance, which were pressed upon General Gates by those best acquainted with the nature of the country, the force of the enemy, and the disposition of the population.

In a note to his first edition, Bancroft says, on the authority of a letter

[259] TOP of de Kalb published by the British," It was the opinion of Kalb that the enemy would not make a stand at Camden," and incorporates the statement in his revised work. In a second note, quoting from Kapp's Life of Kalb, Bancroft further says that Gates was confident that Cornwallis with detached troops from his main body had gone to Savannah. And Gates was right in the supposition that he had gone southward, as Bancroft admits in the statement that on the evening of the tenth of August Cornwallis left Charleston for Camden. "To these encouragements," Bancroft says, "Gates added his own illusions."

The conference of general officers, invited by Gates on the 25th July, did not take place. General Caswell replying form his camp at Moore's Ferry, on the west side of the Yadkin, at ten o'clock the next morning, that Generals Rutherford and Harrington were at Mask's Ferry, forth-five miles below on the east side of the Peedee, adding that he was himself in a bad state of health, and asking to be excused. His letter closed with the information that the militia under his command were passing the Yadkin, and that he proposed to move down to Colston's, thirty miles below, in the fork of the Peedee and Rocky Rivers.

The next day Gates received word from General Stevens, by a letter written from his camp at Col. Thacherstone's the night of the 26th, that he expected to be a Cox's Mill with the Virginia militia, early on the morning of the 28th (July). Aware that the conduct of Caswell was a continuance of the independent action he had maintained against de Kalb's repeated request that he should join the main body, Gates justly considered it to be an intentional evasion of his orders, and alarmed at the consequences which might ensue, determined to effect a junction. In the after orders of the same day (the 26th) the troops were ordered to strike their tents the next morning at half-past three, and the officers were directed to keep their platoons, posts and stations with the nicest exactness, as the advance was towards the enemy. On the morning of he 27th (July) the army moved, General Gates at its head crossed the Deep River at Buffalo Ford, and went into camp in the afternoon at Spinks' farm. Here it was, according to Gordon, that Colonel Otho H. Williams, later his Adjutant-General, repeated to General Gates the advice he had in substance given to Baron de Kalb more than a fortnight before, which was to deviate from the direct road to Camden; to order General Caswell to join him at the mouth of Rocky River on Peedee, thence to Charlotte, and from Charlotte to march by way of Waxhaws toward Camden. Colonel Williams' narrative confirms

[260] TOP this statement, in these words, that "presuming on the friendship of the General, he ventured to expostulate with him upon the seeming precipitate and inconsiderate step he was taking." Bancroft states that the safest route, by way of Salisbury and Charlotte, "was recommended by a memorial of the principal officers," but gives no authority in support of the statement. Colonel Williams asserts that a short note from the most active and intelligent officers was presented to General Gates, concisely intimating the same opinion (he had expressed). General Gates said "that he would confer with the general officers when the troops halted at noon." Whether any conference took place or not, Colonel Williams adds, he did not know. If there were any formal council, the minutes of it should certainly appear among the Gates manuscripts, and the same may be said of the protest of the officers, if such there were-but the extremely full files in the New York Historical Society, from which it is evident that nothing has been designedly excluded, contain no such document. Gordon, who must have questioned Gates on this important point, says, "that a council was called upon the occasion; but the opinion did not prevail; the first motives preponderated, and the army pursued the direct route for Camden." What the first motives were must be looked for in the words used by Gordon in a preceding chapter (III., 392), viz., to effect a junction of the regular and irregular forces, to assume an appearance of hostile views upon the enemy's advance posts. From Gordon's statement, it is probable that de Kalb, and perhaps others, were verbally consulted, and that the importance of striking Camden, before the British garrisons could be concentrated there, outweighed all considerations of comfort or convenience to the army, in the alternative route suggested, or concern as to the character of the population which dwelled upon it.

Camden seems to have been considered as the strategic key to the country by the officers of both armies. Gates and Cornwallis were equally eager to reach it in force, and in the campaign which succeeded Greene and Cornwallis again struggled for its mastery. Moreover, Gates was in possession of information that, alarmed by the approach of the North Carolina militia, which had made their rendezvous at Anson Court House on the 25th of July, Major McArthur had abandoned his post on the Cheraw Hill, and marched straight for Camden, where Lord Rawdon was in command; the inhabitants rising in his rear. It is a nice question for military strategists to determine whether, with the information before him, Gates was or was not justified

[261] TOP in choosing the shorter but more difficult route, in order to strike Camden before it could be adequately reinforced from the more southerly posts. The sequel showed that had he been a day earlier the post might have been carried.

Renewing the march on the 27th Gates reached Colston's on the 28th July and, with increased watchfulness as the army neared the South Carolina borders, moved on the 29th to Kimborough, where he halted till the 1st August, being detained over the 31st by a violent storm. From the camp at Kimborough Gates sent an express to General Caswell on the 29th July, advising him of his movement and intentions, and invited the expression of his views as well as those of General Rutherford upon the circumstances and state of the enemy, all of whose outposts, quite to Camden, he had learned from a British deserter, had been evacuated the Sunday night previous, July 23. He also particularly asked of General Caswell "all intelligence of Lord Cornwallis' designs," and his opinions "what in the circumstances it was best to do." In this deference to Caswell's superior knowledge of country, Gates showed no signs of that reckless indifference to the opinion of others which Colonel Williams apparently imputes to him in the direction of his march.

In reply a letter was received from General Rutherford dated Camp near the Cheraws, July 30th, to the effect that a party sent out to reconnoiter the road toward Camden had gone as far as within fourteen miles of Lynch's Creek, and returned with the intelligence that the British had left the Cheraws, and that the party which retreated from Anson's Court House was encamped at Big Lynch's Creek; and General Caswell the same day sent Brigadier General Harrington from Anson's Court House, an officer well acquainted with the country, to give details of information, expressing himself inclined to the opinion that the enemy would "collect his utmost strength at Camden, where he either intended making a stand or to retreat to Charles Town." This being in accordance with the views already entertained of his purposes, Gates pressed forward his army with all his energy. To General Caswell he wrote in conciliatory terms, excusing the neglect to comply with his summons. Inferring that this officer had put his troops in motion from Deep River he resolved to support him.

On the 30th Gates wrote to General Stevens, who was in his rear, to hurry forward, and directed General Caswell to march by the shortest road to Anderson's to which he was directing his own course.

[262] TOP As he neared the enemy he desired a speedy junction of the whole force, and he had other reasons quite as important. As he advanced he found that Caswell and Rutherford had foraged the country on both sides of the river, while the Virginia militia behind him stopped all the provisions as they came forward, to such an extent that while the outlying bodies were in comparative comfort, the main army was at the point of starvation. Mortified, disappointed and grieved at the sufferings of his troops, the General wrote letters of bitter remonstrance to Governors Jefferson and Nash, at Richmond and Newbern, on whose promises he had relied.

Waiting for the artillery and baggage to come up, and delayed by the storm, the army was not put in motion until the afternoon of Tuesday, the 1st August, when the Maryland brigade crossed the Peedee at Mask's Ferry, and encamped on the east side of the river. Colonel Senf, the engineer, was ordered to trace out a redoubt on the west bank of the river to cover the ferry, and a guard of militia was left to execute the work. The crossing of the river on the 1st being again interfered with by a heavy storm, the artillery was not all gotten over till the next night. On the 3d the march was resumed, with renewed caution to the troops to preserve a perfect discipline, "as though every hour to apprehend a surprise." May's Hill was reached on the 4th, Deep Creek on the 5th.

It required still another summons to persuade General Caswell to put himself on the march. Finally on the 30th he took the required direction and his advanced arrived the next day at the appointed spot. He halted himself, however, with his main body, at Jennings' Branch, where he received information by a "person from the British camp" that there were only about 700 British at Lynch's Creek, a post fifteen miles distant, whom he thought it possible to surprise, and intimated his desire to try the venture. This word he sent by letter to Gates through Colonel Williams, who was instantly returned with consent to the attempt and orders to Colonel Porterfield, who was in the advance in camp at Thompson's Creek, to join in the enterprise, engaging also to cooperate in the movement with the main army, "not doubting that the intelligence could be relied upon." A few hours later a second messenger reached Gates from Caswell, announcing that he had received further information that the enemy, 2,900 strong, were about to march and attack him, and urging instant reinforcement.

General Gates, surprised at this conflicting intelligence, lost confidence in the judgment of Caswell, and alarmed for the safety

[263] TOP the militia, hurried his troops forward. Riding in advance of his army, which halted on the road on the 6th, the General pushed on with Colonel Williams, whom he had that day appointed Deputy Adjutant-General, to Caswell's camp, which he found in confusion and disorder. The next day, the 7th, the main body came up after a forced march of forty miles in two days, and the long desired junction was made at the Deep River Creek Cross Roads.

Bancroft passes by without comment the peculiar conduct of General Caswell. His protracted neglect of the orders given him with his command of the militia to "join and cooperate with the regular forces" is noticed with implied censure by Gordon and Williams. The latter adds, that Gates told him that "Caswell's evasion of orders was caused by the gratification of his vanity at having a separate command, and that he had reason to believe, from the letters of Governor Nash, that the supplies of provisions destined for his army had been used in profusion in Caswell's camp." Surely, never was commander more shabbily treated than Gates in this unfortunate campaign. Yet with an energy unusual in a man of his age, Gates pressed on to reach his objective point, where he counted upon immediate security and abundant supplies from the fertile country. Finding Caswell's troops well armed and accoutred and eager for action, also satisfied that the force of the enemy had not increased from the middle of June, when it was estimated at not exceeding 2,000 at and near Camden, of which 1,000 regulars, 550 loyalists, and 300 cavalry and infantry of the Legion, he dispatched a courier to Colonel Sumpter with news of his movements and a request for the latest intelligence concerning the enemy, and continued his forward march. The army was re-arranged. Major-General the Baron de Kalb at the head of the Maryland troops commanded the right wing, and Major-General Caswell the left wing, North Carolina militia. Before leaving Camp Anderson Gates had placed General Harrington in command of the militia forces raising on the Peedee from the Cheraw district to the mouth of the river, and directed him to make an effort with a picked band to surprise the British Garrison at Georgetown, an enterprise which, if successful, would threaten the security of the British advance posts.

Colonel Armand's legion with Colonel Porterfield's infantry and the light infantry of General Caswell's division, were now thrown forward, with orders to hang upon and harass the rear of the retreating enemy. General orders of the same day (7th) directed that the sick and the superfluous baggage be sent to Charlotte.

[264] TOP At three o'clock the next morning, the 8th, the army marched, and reached the post on Lynch's Creek which Lord Rawdon had evacuated the night before. Here a deserter brought in intelligence that the enemy halted the same morning on an eminence four miles beyond on Little Lynch's Creek, a day's march from Camden, and a much stronger position by nature than that they had left. Here the army encamped in regular order. The retreat of the British left Gates master of the field, but as Colonel Williams observes, "it was a barren one." "To have descended among the fertile fields of Black River would have been," to quote Williams again, "leaving the garrison of Camden between the army and the expected reinforcements from Virginia, besides the refugees from North Carolina repeated their assurances of joining in considerable numbers in a few days."

On the 9th the sick and the heavy baggage left for Charlotte under escort, Colonel Hull was thrown forward six miles on the road leading to Camden by Little Lynch's Creek, and Colonel Senf, the Chief Engineer, was directed to reconnoiter the ground and fix an encampment. Notwithstanding the anxiety of Gates to have his whole force in hand, the nature of the country did not admit of any delay. The last word from General Stevens was than on the 3d he still lay with the Virginia militia, in camp at Cox's, impatient to move, but awaiting supplies, to "cross the desert." The desire of Gates to reach Camden with the least possible delay was heightened by the news he in the course of the day received from Colonel Hull, five miles in advance of the army, that he had intelligence that "Lord Rawdon, with four regiments, was two miles beyond the bridge (at Little Lynch's Creek), and Cornwallis expected that evening." This disposes of Bancroft's assertion that Gates was not aware of Cornwallis' presence with the British army.

On the 10th the army again moved forward, and encamped on Lynch's Heights. On the 11th they advanced as far as Marshall's farm, on Little Lynch's Creek. Here it was discovered "that the enemy's post was on the south side of the water on commanding ground; that the way leading to it was over a causeway on the north side to a wooden bridge, which stood on very steep banks; and that the creek lay in a deep muddy channel, bounded on the north by an extensive swamp, and passable nowhere within several miles, but in the face of the enemy's work. The enemy was not disposed to abandon these advantages without feeling the pulse of the approaching army; and General Gates observed that to attack him in front "would be to take the bull by the horns." It was necessary

[265] TOP for once to depart from the shortest route to the enemy's principal outpost-Camden."

Finding the enemy inclined to dispute the passage of the stream, Gordon says that an "appearance of taking that route was kept up." The army, which had been moving by the left, was on the morning of the 12th marched by the right towards Clermont or Rugeley's Mills. Armand's legion leading the way, followed by the Maryland division of regulars, while the North Carolina division of militia brought up the rear, with Porterfield's light infantry on their left flank. The change of march was covered and concealed by Colonel Hull with a detachment from the Maryland division.

This movement Bancroft condemns. "By a forced march up the stream" he says, "Gates could have turned Lord Rawdon's flank, and made an easy conquest of Camden. Missing his only opportunity, on the 11th, after a useless halt of two days, he defiled by the right, and marching to the north of Camden, on the 13th encamped at Clermont, which the British had just abandoned. The time thus allowed Rawdon used to strengthen himself by four companies from Ninety-six, as well as by the troops from Clermont, and to throw up redoubts at Camden." On a matter of tactics of this nature military critics must be allowed to decide. Johnson, in his incidental account of this campaign in his Life of Green, charges upon Gates as a military error that, opposed by a very inferior force to his own on the banks of Lynch's Creek, he should have suffered himself to be forced to ascent its left bank, and to pass its head, instead of forcing his way across to Camden. But from what Williams says of the nature of the ground, the passage could not have been forced without severe loss.

In addition to these motives for diverging from the direct route, was the receipt of information from Colonel Sumpter (Camp Waxsaw, 9th August) that on the evening of the Sunday previous (the 7th) he had fallen upon the British camp at Hanging Rock, and defeated them with severe loss. In his letter Sumpter says: "Both British and Tories are panic struck, and seem well convinced that fifteen hundred men can go through any part of the State with ease," and he adds, "this will not be the case ten or fifteen days hence;" and urged strongly on Gates to send a force take possession of the high hills and Neilson's ferry, a central post, which commands all the passages, both by land and water, to Charlestown. Twelve to fifteen hundred men he considered enough for this purpose. On the 11th this enterprising officer sent further advice, that he had taken possession of all the passways over the Wateree

[266] TOP River, five miles below Camden, and that all the British guards had been ordered into Camden. He reported the number of British regular troops as not exceeding twelve hundred, and the militia as less than one thousand, generally sickly and dispirited, and that a reinforcement of five hundred was expected from Charlestown to arrive in two days. Elias Langham, a sergeant of artillery from the British camp, reported that on the 11th August the effective force at Camden was 2,365 men, of which 1,770 were regulars. He also testified on his examination that Cornwallis was near with a reinforcement of Hessians, said to be at the Congaree.

On the 12th Colonel Sumpter wrote word from his camp, at Sands' Ford on the Catawba River, that no detachment had been made from the British post of Ninety-six, and that Camden was defenceless, unless the troops had retreated into it, which he did not believe, but that works were construction at the Saw Mills. He expressed himself as "clear that they meant to make no great opposition at Camden, but that all their preparations were mere amusements, by which they expected to gain time to remove their sick and wounded." He also reported three large boats, laden with salt, rum, sugars and clothing, had just come up on the way to Charlestown, and urged Gates to send a party to fall in their rear and cut off these supplies. And he again reported that the enemy were gaining strength to the westward, and that the advance of the American arms "depended much on dispatch," and a push into the heart of the country "settles the business in three weeks time, as well in Charles Town as in the Country, the enemy being so detached that they can't oppose an army," and he closes his letter with the significant sentence: "The next of your favors I am honoured with I hope will be from Santee or Camden."

In the morning of the 13th Colonel Porterfield sent in word that he had been "through the late encampment of the enemy, which they had left, and were now all in Camden." Surely in the face of this cumulative testimony, it cannot be charged upon Gates that he did not take every precaution to provide against surprise, and to obtain information, or that he was unaware of the numbers and movements of the enemy, or the presence of Cornwallis. The evidence now produced from his papers is conclusive on all these points.

On the 13th General Stevens arrived in camp with the long-expected reinforcements of Virginia militia, and Gates felt himself strong enough to detach one hundred of the Maryland line, three hundred militia and a company of artillery with two brass pieces to join Colonel Sumpter

[267] TOP in his proposed attempt to cut off the convoys on the Wateree, about a mile from Camden. Gordon says they were sent "to join Colonel Sumpter." The same words are used by Williams, but Bancroft says that "Sumpter appearing in camp with four hundred men, asked for as many more to intercept a convoy with its stores, on the road from Charleston to Camden." Gordon and Williams also agree in saying that the stores were on their way to Camden, but Sumpter's letter is distinct. "If (he says) these large convoys of provisions, which are now intended for Charles Town, were cut off, that place could by no means hold out by a few days if besieged."

It is singular there should be a doubt on a point like this. If, as Bancroft states, Sumpter came into camp with four hundred men and took as many more away, Gates diminished his force by a detachment equal to a fourth of his whole army. If the provisions were going to Camden the temptation was great both to deprive the enemy and to supply himself; if to Charleston, the venture had but the latter stimulant. Where statements are so radically different, all authorities should be produced that the point be settled.

Commenting on this diversion Bancroft says, "Gates, who believed himself at the head of seven thousand men, granted his (Sumpter's) request." This is a repetition of Williams" statement, that Gates "showed him a rough estimate of the forces under his command, making them upward of seven thousand; whereupon he showed him by the field return that the numbers of rank and file fit for duty was exactly three thousand and fifty-two." Gordon says that when the Deputy Adjutant-General showed Gates an abstract of the field returns, from which it appeared that there were 4,033 men, "this force was inferior to what the General imagined." No doubt the General was disappointed, but it is too much to ask of ordinary credulity to believe that a man like Gates, who had been bred to arms, had himself been the Adjutant-General of the American army, in which capacity he did admirable service, and whose correspondence shows him to have been the most methodical of men, could have so grossly misconceived the extent of his force. It must be remembered also that the Maryland line, the light infantry, the cavalry and artillery were fixed quantities-1,340 men. He must have known the strength of the reinforcements General Stevens brought in on the 13th-700 men. These, together, amounted to about 2,000 men. The chance of false estimate is therefore confined to the numbers of Caswell's North Carolina division; and it is not very likely that Gates would have estimated this body, whose separate

[268] TOP camp he had visited, at five thousand men if it did not consist of more than two thousand, according to Gordon, or one thousand if we accept Colonel Williams' statement as to the active numerical force.

The final catastrophe is now approached. Strong or weak there was nothing left to the army but to advance, and as has been seen there was no reason for discouragement. Moreover the reinforcing militia had brought with them no supplies to aid the starving army; behind was a sterile desert, whose scant yield had already been stripped to the last blade; in front the fertile plains and rich valleys of South Carolina; between this land of promise and the advancing army lay the enemy they had come to meet and were anxious to engage; and the contest did not seem unequal.

On the 15th, according to Gordon, "Gates convened his general officers, of which there were not less than thirteen, and after a conference with them directed his Adjutant General, Col. Williams, to issue his marching orders, the army to move at ten o'clock in the night." Colonel Williams says there was "no dissenting voice in the council." Bancroft, that Gates "was listened to in silence." The orders were, according to Williams, no sooner promulgated than they became the subject of animadversion. Nowhere, however, is there any information that the dissatisfaction of the officers was with the order of march. The objection is said to have been to the night march with troops two-thirds militia. The marching orders, however, prescribed "the profoundest silence." Besides, as Williams justly observes in this connection, neither officers nor men "knew or believed any more than the General that any considerable body of the enemy were to be met with out of Camden." The purpose of Gates was to "take a position on some good grounds" (to use Gordon's words,) in the vicinity of Camden, and to be in supporting distance of Sumpter.

The army marched at the hour appointed, and before daylight fell in with the British advance. The troops were formed in line of battle, and a council of officers immediately summoned. The information obtained from prisoners captured by the advance guard was communicated, that Cornwallis in person was in front of them, and their opinions asked. Stevens exclaimed, "It is now too late to retreat," and it is difficult to see how a retreat could have been successfully made. The authorities essentially agree in the account of the battle. The Virginians were led to the attack, but the British troops moving down upon them with impetuosity, threw the whole body into such a panic that, according to Williams, "they threw down their loaded arms and fled in the utmost

[269] TOP [101]

[270] TOP consternation. The unworthy example of the Virginians was almost instantly followed by the North Carolinians. * * * The torrent of unarmed militia bore away with it Generals Gates, Caswell, and a number of others. General Gates at first conceived a hope that he might rally at Clermont a sufficient number of the militia to cover the retreat of the regulars; but the further they fled the wider they dispersed, and the generals soon found themselves abandoned, by all but their aids." The next morning Gates left Caswell to rally such troops as might come in, and assemble the militia of Mecklenburg County, and himself hastened to Hillsborough, to concert some plan of defence with the Legislature of the State, "considering not (says Gordon) that by shortening his journey and remaining at Charlotte or Salisbury, appearances would be less unfavorable to his personal reputation, though less beneficial to the public cause." Gordon says: "Gates was borne off the field by a torrent of dismayed militia. They constituted so great a part of his army that when he saw them break and flee with such precipitation, he lost every hope of victory, and his only care was, if possible, to rally a sufficient number to cover the retreat of the regular troops." Bancroft ignores the statements of Williams and Gordon, and charges that "Gates and Caswell took to flight with the militia, leaving his army without orders." Fortunately there is other evidence than that of Williams and Gordon.

Among the Steuben papers in the New York Historical Society collections there is an account of Gates' movements from the 13th of August, when he arrived at Rugeley's House, Clermont, till his arrival at Hillsborough on the 19th. This valuable document is endorsed "Plan of Camden by Colonel Senff." Colonel Christian Senff was the Chief Engineer of the southern army. He had been detached with the troops sent to Colonel Sumpter, and it was he that brought word to Gates after the fate of the day at Camden was decided, of Sumpter's complete success. Gates sent him with dispatches to Congress, announcing his own defeat. The plan which accompanies the account is supposed to be his drawing. Both are given in the appendix. He describes the manner in which Gates endeavored in "person to bring the militia into order and fire," and, "closed in upon by the enemy's horse, was forced with Colonel Armand and his escort to wheel." An how he (Gates) personally a second time hoped to bring them into order at some distance, but again in vain; and closely pursued, barely escaped with two of his aids. Armand's horse reduced to fourteen men, being unable to follow even. Colonel Senff further states that it was "with the

[271] TOP advice of his officers that Gates thought proper to get by the assistance of the night through that part of the country to Hillsborough, where there had been left some detachments of artillery, and that most chiefly the militia had directed their course that way, and it was therefore more probable to reassemble some of the scattered militia in that quarter, and draw all the detachments together, till other measures could be taken."

There is also among the Gates papers in the New York Historical Society collections an account of the battle by Major McGill, who, as may be seen by the General Orders of the 9th, had been an "extra aid-de-camp to the commander in chief." The account was given by that officer in a letter to his father, of which Gates later obtained a copy for his files. McGill describes the "chasm made between the two brigades" by the flight of the militia, and the effectual manner in which the enemy's horse, charging through the opening and turning the rear, cut off the commander in chief from any further communication with the Maryland division. The veteran heroes stood firmly, under the brave de Kalb, and redeemed the honors, "if not the fortunes of the day." He speaks also of Gates "riding to stop the militia." "Had they there not run like cowards," concludes McGill, "our army was sufficient to cope with them (the British), drawn up as we were upon a rising and advantageous ground." If further evidence be needed, it may be found in the letter of General Stevens to General Gates (also in the Gates papers at the New York Historical Society), dated August 21st, from his camp at Parsons' Farm, 18 miles from Masque's Ferry. L "I rejoice to hear of your being safe; but most sincerely condole with you for our misfortunes, and more especially as they were brought on by ye damned rascally behavior of ye militia. My feelings never knew what it was to be hurt before, tho' to repine is unmanly and answers no good end; therefore am determined, and am now ready to obey your commands with double ardor." Of the bravery of Stevens there has never been question. Williams calls him "the gallant Stevens."

To pass from these opinions of eye-witnesses and actors in the events of the disastrous day to other contemporaneous authorities; General Greene, writing from Camp at Kennemark, September 5, 1780, to Governor Green or Rhode Island, concurs in the same general testimony; "General Gates made several unsuccessful attempts to rally the militia, but they were so panic struck, it was all to no purpose, and the general was borne away on the road, and had the mortification to leave the Maryland Line bravely engaged, without having it in his power to assist them, or even to tell what was their fate."

[272] TOP Greene visited the battle-ground in company with Colonel Williams in 1781. Williams in his narrative says that the choice of the field was approved by that "judicious and gallant" officer. Gordon (IV., 98) quotes a letter of Greene, written from the High Hills of Santee, 8 August, 1781, to a friend at Philadelphia, which confirms this statement, and contains a complete vindication of Gates' conduct in and after the action.

"Gen. Gates left this country under a heavy load; and I can assure you he did not deserve it. If he was to be blamed for anything at all, it was for fighting, not for what he did or did not do in or after the action. I have been upon the ground where he was defeated, and think it was well chosen, and the troops properly drawn up; and had he halted after the defeat at Charlotte, without doing the least thing, I am persuaded there would have been as little murmuring upon that occasion as in any instance whatever, where the public meet with misfortune of equal magnitude." By common accord Greene stands at the head of the military men developed by the long struggle, and his unsupported testimony is alone sufficient to outweigh the censorious criticism of civilians or historians of whatever grade. He commanded the very troops who had been defeated under Gates, was surrounded by their officers, acquainted with their opinions, and his practical eye had measured the route of the army and the scene of the contests.

How Washington was affected by the news appears in his letter of the 8th October to Gates. "The shock was the greater," he says, "as the operations a few days preceding the action were much in our favor. The behaviour of the Continental troops does them infinite honor." This letter is printed by Sparks in his Writings of Washington, VII., 237. What lesson he drew from the conduct of the militia may be seen in his as yet unpublished circular letter, a copy of which addressed to Governor George Clinton, from his headquarters near Passaic Falls, 18th October, 1780, is in the New York State Library.

"America has been almost amused out of her liberties. We have often heard the behaviour of the Militia extolled upon one and another occasion by men who judge only from the surface; by men who had particular views in misrepresenting-by visionary men, whose credulity easily swallows every vague story in support of a favorite Hypothesis. I solemnly declare I never was witness to a single instance that countenances an opinion of Militia or raw troops being fit for real business of fighting. I have found them useful as light parties to skirmish in the Woods, but incapable of making or sustaining a serious attack. This firmness is only acquired by habits of discipline and service. I

[273] TOP mean not to detract from the merit of the Militia. Their zeal and spirit upon a variety of occasions have entitled them to the highest applause, but is of the great importance we should learn to estimate them rightly. We may expect every thing from men that Militia is capable of, but we must not expect from [them] any services for which Regulars alone are fit. The late battle at Campden is a melancholy comment on the doctrine. The militia fled at first fire, and left the Continental troops, surrounded on every side and overpowered by numbers, to combat for safety instead of Victory. The enemy themselves have witnessed to their valor."

The misfortune which befell Gates is not alone in history. It was not unlike that which befell the great Frederick, who was swept off the field of Mollwitz by a part of his own routed army to a great distance, and returned to find the battle had been won by those who remained. To one portion of Bancroft's severe charge, that Gates was "a petty intriguer, but not soldier," this paper has been devoted, and the argument is willingly surrendered to the decision of the candid mind. The conclusion is that Gates moved forward at the earnest solicitation of Congress on the promise of abundant supplies; that once engaged upon the march, to halt or turn back would have been alike disastrous in the effect upon the population of the southern states, and that when the barren desert had been crossed, he pressed on under the double stimulus of abundance in the rich country before him, and the assurances of Sumpter and those best competent to judge that his march to Camden would not be seriously opposed. That his dispositions were not in accordance with true military laws has not yet been asserted by any competent military critic.

Ramsey, in his history of the Revolution of South Carolina, sums up the argument in a sentence. "Though much censure was cast on General Gates for this unfortunate action, yet, upon a careful examination of every circumstance, his chief fault seems to be his risking a battle. He chose the most advantageous ground, drew up his men to the best advantage, but to make them fight was beyond his power." In this the historian concurs with Greene, the best military authority.

Of the equanimity of spirit with which Gates bore his mortification, and the dignity with which he disregarded the malice of his contemporaries, his admirable correspondence is sufficient proof.

The remaining charge of Bancroft, that Gates was a "petty intriguer," is far more grave. Fortunately it is not supported to one atom of evidence. It was not the opinion of his contemporaries, in who his

[274] TOP character was held in high regard. It cannot be shown from his manuscripts, where the correspondence of those of his friends who are said to have been concerned with him in the cabals of the day remains intact; a testimony of conscious innocence. Gates at the time himself indignantly repudiated any connection with the intrigues against Washington, and Gordon, who examined his papers in 1781, records that "there was not a single paragraph to be met with that contained any intimation of his being concerned in any such plan."

General Gates died childless. The news of the death of his only son, "an elegant young man, well educated and just entering the active scenes of life," was kept from him while in camp, after the battle of Camden, but added to the bitterness of his retirement. His fame has no defence save the use that historians may make of his abundant manuscripts, to which he seems to have left the perfect vindication of his capacity and his character. And this silent appeal is not in vain. The disaster of Waterloo will never blot out the glory of Austerlitz, nor the rout of Camden efface the memory of Saratoga.

Washington, in one of his letters to Major Tallmadge consoling him for his mishap on the expedition with which he had been entrusted, made use of an expression which may well be applied to the conduct of Gates. The experience of the great chief had been chequered. He has as often felt the humiliation of defeat as the exultation of victory. "However," wrote Washington, "it may be the practice of the world and those who see objects but partially, or through a false medium, to consider that only as meritorious which is attended with success. I have accustomed myself to judge of human actions very differently and to appreciate them by the manner in which they are conducted, more than by the event; which it is not in the power of human foresight and precedence to command." Let Gates be measured by this standard.

JOHN AUSTIN STEVENS

1. The History of the Revolution of South Carolina, from a British Province to an Independent State. By David Ramsay, M. D., Member of the American Congress. In two volumes. 8vo. Isaac Collins. Trenton, 1785.

2. The History of the Rise, Progress and Establishment of the Independence of the United States of America; including an account of the late war; and of the thirteen colonies, from their origin to that period. By William Gordon, D. D. In four volumes. 8vo. London, 1788.

3. The History of South Carolina from the first settlement in 1670 to the year 1808. In two volumes. By David Ramsay, M. D. 8vo. David Longworth. Charleston, 1809 [275] TOP

4. A Narrative of the Campaign of 1780. By Colonel Otho Holland Williams, Adjutant General. Printed as Appendix B to Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene, Major General of the Armies of the United States, in the War of the Revolution. Compiled chiefly from original materials, by William Johnson of Charleston, South Carolina. In two volumes, 4to. A. E. Miller. Charleston, 1822.

5. The Historical Society Collection of Gates' Papers contains drafts or copies of the letters of General Gates for this period, but no Order Book.

6. History of the United States of America from the Discovery of the Continent. By George Bancroft. In six volumes. Thoroughly revised edition. Vol. VI., 16mo. Little, Brown & Co. Boston, 1876

7. History of the United States from the Discovery of the American Continent. By George Bancroft. Vol. X., 8 vo. Little, Brown & Co. Boston, 1874

[108]

A few Hours after this a Detachment of 70 men of the 71^st & 33^rd Regts came from Ninety Six to join the Enemy at Camden, were likewise taken Prisoners by Gen^l Sumpter, after which the Enemy made motion to cross the river below to attack him; he retreated up the River that Night for 10 miles, of which Co^l Senf return^d to report to Gen^l Gates.

The 15^th Gen^l Gates, as the 700 Virg^a Militia, under B Gen^l Stevens made junction, consulted with all the General Officers on taking another Position for the Army, as the Ground where they were upon was by no means tenable. On reconnoitering a Deep Creek, 7 miles in the front, was found impassable 7 miles to the Right, & about the same distance to the left, except only at the place where the Ford intersects the great road. It was Unanimously agreed upon to march that Night the Army to that Creek, by which means they would get a more secure Encampment, come nearer Gen^l Sumpter, occupy the road on the East side of Wateree river, and would be able to get nearer intelligence of the Enemy. As for to march back on that Road, and take an equal Strong or Stronger Position, was not certain, would have given the Enemy a weak opinion of our Strength & more encouragement to attack — The Communication with Gen^l Sumpter, which had been effected, yet rather too great a distance, would have been given up again, difficult of getting Intelligence of the Enemy, & our Horses in want of Forage. To march to the Right to fall into the road on the East side of Wateree river (if even the road would have admitted of it), but it would not without a great deal of work, & Pioneers too were wanted, the Baggage of the Army would have been exposed; the Road where Supplys came from open to the Enemy & impossible to turn those Waggons directly into another road before the Enemy's Horse might have cut them off from the Army.

Certain Intelligence came the 15^th to Gen^l Gates that Lord Cornwallis had arriv^d the Evening before at Camden, & a reinforcement had arriv^d that Day, but no certainty of the Strength could be obtain^d.

The 15^th, the Evening, at 10 o'clock the Army march^dfrom Rugeley's to take Post in Front at the mentioned Creek in the following order — Co^l Armand's Legion (a) made the Van, supported by 200 Light Infantry on each Flank under Co^l Potterfield (b). The Van Guard of the Army (c). The first (d) and second (d) Maryland Brigade, under Major Gen^l Baron de Kalbe, each Brigade two field pieces; the three Brigades of North Carollina Militia under Gen^l Caswell. The Virginia Militia under Gen^l Stevens, the Artillery (e), Stores and the Rear Guard. During the march Reconoitering Parties, sent out from the advanc^d Corps, came back, & nothing seen in the Road, soon after, (about half an Hour after two in the morning of the 16^th August) Co^l. Armand's Van party got hail^d by an advanc^d party of the Enemy; an answer was made directly on our side on which the Enemy's Horse immediately charg^d furiously with a great deal of Huzzas (f). Co^l. Armand stood the charge, & Co^l Potterfield's light Infantry (g) gave a crossing Fire upon the Enemy's Horse, which made them retreat immediately, upon which

General Gates form^d order of Battle, viz —

The Second Maryland Brigade (1) about 400 men under Brig Gen Gist on the right of the road leading to Camden, two field pieces on his right (2) & an almost unpassable Swamp & Gregs Quarter Creek on the right of field pieces, on the left of the Brigade in the main road two Field Pieces (3), the three Brigades of North Carolina Militia (4) of 1200 Men under the Brigadiers Rutherford, Graigery & Butler, two Field Pieces (5) the Virginia Militia (6) of 700 men under Brigadier Gen^l Stevens, the Light Infantry (7) then about 300 men under Co^l Potterfield, and Co^l Armand with the Horse about 60 (8) in the rear of the Light Infantry to support the left. The first Maryland Brigade (9) about 400 men under Brig Gen^l Smallwood in the rear of the Line across the road, as a Corps of Reserve.

Half an Hour before sun rise, the Enemy came in sight, drove in our advanc^d Posts, and as soon as they came in proper distance, our artillery began to play upon them. Their first Troops suppos^d Light Infantry, display^d, form^d and advanced on their left on the road with a field piece (10). Their Main Body (11) display^d to their right, when in the time they displayed our Field pieces made a good fire upon their column. Before the Enemy had fully display^d their Line, Gen^l Gates gave orders to Gen^l Stevens of the Virginia Militia & Light Infantry to advance in good order & make the attack, gave likewise immediate orders to Gen^l Smallwood to advance with the Corps of reserve, to support the Left Wing and occupy the Ground of Gen^l Stevens. Gen^l Gates rode up to Gen^l Gist, gave orders to advance slowly with the Brigade, to reserve their fire till proper distance, fire & charge Bayonets which has been according to orders Executed. They came close, Gen^l Gist's Brigade took a Field Piece from the Enemy and kept it some time. Our Army's position was by that time such as (12), and the Enemy's (13). The North Carolina & Virginia Militia all broke & dispers^d in the utmost confusion, no sooner the Enemy's Horse discovered the confusion than they chrg^d (14), they wheeled to the right & Left, took the 1^st & 2^d M. Brigade in their Flanks & rear (16), when in the mean time the Enemy advanced in their Front, to which of course our brave Troops have fallen a Sacrifice.[106] General Gates, who was in the rear of the 2^d Maryland Brigade, after having given the mentioned order look^d back to the road, saw the Militia run and the Enemy's Horse charge, rode to the militia & Endeavored himself with the assistance of General Caswell and Aids to bring the Militia into order and fire, but all in vain, the Enemy's Horse then came so close upon the General & Co^l Armand oblig^d to wheel. The General then hop^d to bring them to order at some Distance, but neither this would do, the militia was struck with such a Panick & obeyed no more command. The Baggage, which had been ordered off to Retreat in the night, on the road to the Waxaws, was so retarded by obstruction of the Night, bad roads & tired Horses, as to fall

FIELD OF BATTLE WITHIN EIGHT MILES OF CAMDEN
[August 1780]

Col^o Armand's Corps, about seventy Horse in front, Col^o Porterfield with 50 men belonging to our Reg^t, and 150 Militia upon Armand's right flank, about two Hundred yards off the road — Maj^ro Carolina militia upon Armand's left Flank, in the same order — Col^o Armand's orders were, should the Enemy's Horse attack him, to stand their charge, and Porterfield with the other Light Infantry to flank them — Gen' Smallwood's Brigade in front, Gen^l Gist's followed, the N^o Carolina Division under Gen^l Caswell next, and in the rear the Virginia Brigade commanded by Gen^l Stevens — After marching in this order nigh five miles, about half after two in the morning the British Horse made a most violent onset Huzzaing all the time, but were bravely repulsed by Porterfield with considerable loss — The Enemy's Light infantry next came up, the Virginia militia or the Greatest part that were with Porterfield took to their heels, and left the men belonging to our Reg^t to stand the Attack of the whole light troops; which to their Honour they did for about five minutes, in which a warm and incessant fire was kept up — Col^o Porterfield then ordered a retreat, and in turning his horse about had his leg shattered by a musket ball, which struck him upon the shin Bone — After some time the firing ceased, our line was formed, and Half and Hour before sun rise the Enemy advanced — Our Army Drawn up in the same order as in their march, only that Gist's Brigade was on our Right, Smallwood's being formed in the Rear as a Corps Du reserve. Immediately on the Enemy's driving in our Party Front, Gen^l Stevens was ordered to advance & Attack their right, and

CAMP AT KENNEMARK, Sept. 5th, 1780.

We lost eight pieces of cannon, and doubtless all our baggage and stores. The militia dispersing and taking to the woods, few or none of them fell into the enemy's hands, but probably many of them might suffer greatly for want of provisions, and perhaps some might perish.

General Gates retreated one hundred and eighty miles in three days to Hillsborough, at which place he wrote to Congress of the misfortune which had befell him.

This is a great misfortune; and the more so as that unfortunate country was too discouraged before to make any great exertions. However, it was beginning to recover itself, and some few days before the action we had gained several advantages, and taken several hundred prisoners.

It is high time for America to raise an army for the war, and not distress the country by short enlistments, and hazard the liberties of these States with an order of men, whose feelings, let their principles be ever so good, cannot be like those who have been long in the field.

your most obedient, humble servant,

NATH. GREENE,

To His Excellency Governor Greene.